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Approved For Release 2005/08/03 : CIA-RDP93B01194R001300060004-8

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

1 5 MAR 1982

Dr. Robert M. Warner
Archivist of the United States
National Archives and Records Service
Eighth Street & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20408

Dear Dr. Warner:

In the course of 1981 Dr. Edward Weldon, Deputy Archivist of the United States, and several members of your staff met with Mr. Thomas White, then Director of Information Services, and several staff members of this Agency to discuss the problem of identifying information concerning intelligence sources and methods that may be found in unclassified records held at the National Archives. The concern was that National Archives and Records Service (NARS) personnel, when reviewing records which carry no classification markings, might overlook information concerning intelligence sources and methods that requires protection. To aid NARS in overcoming this problem, it was agreed that CIA would draw up guidelines designed to help NARS personnel identify this type of information, which will then be set aside for review by CIA personnel. Such information will be protected under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence to protect information concerning intelligence sources and methods.

The problem becomes more acute as systematic classification review at NARS progresses and involves documents of more recent years when CIA was becoming more active. Unmarked documents of interest to us may well exist in earlier records and may have gone unnoticed during systematic review of those records; however, to review again that material in its entirety for this purpose would be a tremendous undertaking and possibly not worth the effort. As we gain additional experience, we may be able to pinpoint where intelligence sources and methods information may be found. We would like to keep open the option of screening again certain categories of records at NARS that have undergone systematic review but may have a high potential for containing information requiring protection as determined by experience.

The guidelines, which are attached, have been written with the following objectives: (1) to describe the various types of activities in which CIA engages; (2) to indicate the records which these activities would generate; and (3) to suggest where those records may be found particularly if they are unclassified. Since we do not have a great deal of experience with unclassified records of other U.S. Government agencies, the guidelines will be rather tentative. We hope that with experience they can be expanded and made more useful.

Unclassified when
Separated from
Attachment

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We appreciated the opportunity to discuss this issue with your personnel. They presented the problem very clearly and we found the frank and free exchange of views most informative and helpful. If you or your staff should desire further discussion of this issue, please do not hesitate to contact us.

Sincerely,

[Redacted Signature]

Director of Information Services
Directorate of Administration

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Attachment:

Guidelines to aid NARS personnel
identify unclassified information
concerning intelligence sources
and methods

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee w/att

1 - OIS Subject w/att

1 - OIS Chrono w/o att

1 - CRD Liaison w/NARS *JK*

[Redacted Box]

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GUIDELINES TO AID NARS IDENTIFY UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION
CONCERNING INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS

Generally speaking, information that concerns intelligence activities, sources, and methods is classified. Intelligence activities, by their nature, must be carried out in secrecy and the records they generate must be protected for many years. This latter point was reflected in the waiver approved by ISOO which established a period of 30 years for the systematic re-review of such information. Generally speaking, we believe that information concerning intelligence activities, sources, and methods must be protected for a minimum of 75 years. In spite of the general need and the longevity required for protection of intelligence-related information, some of this material may carry no classification markings and be found among unclassified records. This could happen in records relating to cover, to the creation and maintenance of proprietary organizations, to obtaining support from outside organizations, and to any dealings that extend outside the service itself. Cover is an open and overt status that provides a plausible explanation for the presence and activities of an intelligence service. Cover is an open and legal device and when it is provided by another government agency the records generated may well be unclassified.

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Many of their activities are carried out overtly and correspondence relating to such activities will not be classified. A proprietary organization is an overt business entity owned or controlled by an intelligence service that is used to provide cover for conducting intelligence operations. Normally, a proprietary operates openly and does not generate classified information. What is sensitive and requires protection is the connection between the "proprietary" and the intelligence service. Some "proprietaries," like Air America, may deal with many U.S. Government agencies, and their correspondence could be found in the records of these agencies. Finally, an intelligence service must get all manner of support from other organizations both governmental and private. This will include all the materials and services that are required to keep a large and diverse organization functioning, help in the development and manufacture of many items, some of which are very esoteric, and consultations on just about every subject imaginable. The sensitivity of the records surrounding these activities is twofold: it is necessary to protect the intelligence service so that its work is not compromised; and it is necessary to protect the business, institute, private enterprise, or government agency which could be damaged by revelations of involvement with an intelligence service and result in denying further support from that entity. Furthermore, as in all sensitive intelligence service activities, confidentiality and discretion are promised or implied and this trust cannot be abandoned lightly.

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Next 5 Page(s) In Document Exempt

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

FROM:

CRD/OIS/DDA
322 Ames

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

26 January 1982

STAT

	TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE		OFFICER'S INITIALS	COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
		RECEIVED	FORWARDED		
1.	OSB/CCS/DO GH 44 Headquarters	27 JAN 1982	2/2/82	W.H.C.	Attached is the draft of a guideline intended for use by the personnel of the National Archives and Records Service as explained in the covering letter addressed to the Archivist of the United States. Your comments and suggestions on the appropriateness of the guideline would be most appreciated. <div>STAT</div> <div>1:5 - <div></div> Per our tele-STAT</div> <div>I'd like to suggest that a higher classification be given this paper. I believe that, in the wrong hands, this paper would serve as an excellent guide to anyone searching for info on C.I.A.. The info which could be obtained would range from Confidential through our highest classifications. Additionally I feel the paper in itself reveals sufficient agency organizational data and info on intelligence methods to justify at least a "Secret" classification.</div>
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